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Timothy Taylor 
The structure of this volume is straightforward. The first four papers each focus 
on a high-profile service industry: child care, education, health care, and long- 
term care for the elderly. The remaining six papers focus in various ways on 
how social science, and economic methodology in particular, might grapple 
with the sorts of issues raised by these four service industries. Each paper is 
followed by a discussant’s comment. 
This overview has three objectives. I present  an overall orientation toward 
the volume, with brief summaries of the papers. I spend somewhat more space 
offering a description of the roundtable discussions that took place at the con- 
ference. This description is not exhaustive:  it is one person’s perspective  on 
what it was like to attend the conference. Finally, I offer a few thoughts of my 
own about why the child care, education, health, and long-term care services 
discussed here pose special difficulties for economists and for public policy. 
1.1  Child Care 
Child care is often viewed as custodial: a service provided so that mothers 
can earn money in the paid labor market. This issue is important, of course; 
it’s tied up with efforts of middle-class mothers to build economic security for 
their families, and it’s tied up with helping poor mothers get off welfare and 
into work. In fact, Arleen Leibowitz makes the interesting point that welfare 
can be viewed as a child care program, in which the government pays many 
of the mothers who are most economically vulnerable to stay home and look 
after children. 
But in her paper in this volume, Leibowitz focuses instead on the notion of 
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child care as an investment  in the human capital of tomorrow’s adults. Her 
paper discusses various types of child care, issues surrounding the quality and 
financing of such care, and the possible role for government involvement. Lei- 
bowitz points out that the gains may be especially large for children starting 
off  on the  bottom  rungs  of America’s  socioeconomic ladder.  Good-quality 
child care may provide a start in life that makes success in school more likely, 
and thus offers a start toward a middle-class economic future. Moreover, al- 
though there is less evidence on this point, child care may serve as an early 
intervention that helps to counteract neighborhood pathologies of crime, abuse, 
and children giving birth to other children. As one conference participant put 
it, in discussing the life of many children who grow up in poor inner-city areas, 
“[tlhe harm is so great right now, one might choose something else just in des- 
peration,” 
But if  there  is a general sense that  improved access to child  care might 
greatly  benefit  at least some children  and mothers,  society must develop a 
greater consensus on a number of issues before any substantial policy change 
is likely to be adopted. Some of the issues raised in the discussion at the confer- 
ence went to the heart of child care policy. 
For example, any public subsidy to child care is necessarily an encourage- 
ment to mothers to put their children into such programs. But how strongly 
should society encourage mothers to put their children into child care? Perhaps 
the tax credit for child care should be expanded, although this affects mainly 
working mothers. Perhaps a portion of Aid to Families with Dependent Chil- 
dren (AFDC) or child-support payments might be earmarked for child care; 
this would affect mainly single mothers. Perhaps, given the evidence on how 
child care provides relatively greater benefits to socioeconomically disadvan- 
taged children, one might require as a condition of receiving welfare that moth- 
ers put their children into a registered child care program. 
When society offers a subsidy, whether for child care or anything else, it 
usually comes with strings attached. At the extreme, one might envision direct 
federal provision of day care. However, no one at this conference spoke out in 
favor of such an extreme step. Some opposed anything resembling such a step 
with  particular vehemence,  arguing that  a federally provided  system would 
come loaded down with costly regulations: about types of toys; cumculum for 
the preschoolers; details about buildings where child care would be provided, 
including plumbing, electricity, entry and exit, and construction; specifications 
for advanced education, experience, and training for child care workers and 
administrators; and so on and so on. 
The conference discussion among economists (many of whom are also par- 
ents) illustrated that parents have strong and differing feelings about the provi- 
sion of child care. Some would prefer a well-run institution, with regular hours, 
professional  staff, and lots of flexibility for those days when the parents are 
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woman who loves kids and sets up a small day care establishment in her home. 
Still others would prefer a live-in nanny or au pair. Along with different prefer- 
ences for how child care should be provided, those at the conference expressed 
varying preferences for how their two-year-old should best spend a day. Some 
would  emphasize more  structured and particular learning: making  sure that 
two- and three-year-olds learn colors and shapes and counting to ten. Others 
prefer that their preschoolers learn to play with others and to have good associ- 
ations with attending school. Social science studies have offered little guidance 
on the “best” sort of child care, if such care exists. 
As Leibowitz points  out in  her paper,  and  the conference  discussion  ac- 
knowledged,  families will play the key role in determining the type of care 
their children receive. But this raises the potential problem of segregating chil- 
dren at an early age, whether by income, ethnicity, type of curriculum, or some 
other standard. On the other side, one participant in the discussion pointed out 
that any segregation in day care will probably be no worse than the de facto 
segregation  that  already  exists  both  between  school  districts  and  within 
schools. Given that adults are probably more integrated in their work arrange- 
ments than in their housing patterns, child care that was provided close to the 
workplace might end  up more  socioeconomically  and  ethnically  integrated 
than many school districts. 
1.2  Education 
Eric Hanushek has led the way in pointing out some uncomfortable  facts 
about the lack of any significant correlation between educational inputs and 
outputs. For example, US. education  spending over the last century has in- 
creased at triple the growth rate of the gross domestic product. Real per-student 
expenditures quintupled from 1890 to 1940-and  then quintupled again from 
1940 to 1990. Yet even as the commitment of resources was rising, the perfor- 
mance of the U.S. educational system, as measured by a variety of standardized 
tests and international comparisons, has been declining. 
Hanushek’s paper in this volume discusses why the debate over improving 
the schools seems to emphasize increasing expenditures, rather than improve- 
ments in the quality of schooling. For example, many policy discussions come 
close to defining school quality or concerns over equity as a matter of  the level 
or equality of spending, rather than focusing on the efficiency of that spending. 
Although claims are often made that education has positive externalities that 
justify  greater  spending, Hanushek  points  out that, when  one presses for a 
definition and magnitude of the externalities that would result from increases 
in education spending above present levels, they often become vague and dif- 
ficult to grasp. 
Most of the discussion at the conference focused on evidence that increasing 
inputs to education have not bought much in the way of measurable outputs. It 16  Timothy Taylor 
was noted that opponents of higher funding for education have seized on the 
lack of a statistical correlation, while supporters of higher funding for schools 
have been outraged by a conclusion that, to them, sounds like a cover-up for 
hard-heartedness. Such controversies often seem to surround empirical work. 
It’s  been  said that a person  with one watch knows what time it is, while a 
person  with  two watches  can never be sure. In  a similar  spirit, it might be 
asserted that a social scientist with one regression study always knows the cor- 
rect answer, but a social scientist with many regression studies can never be 
sure. Yet in the discussion of Hanushek’s paper at the conference, the distinc- 
tions over more or less dollars seemed less black and white than they are typi- 
cally presented. 
If society were to contemplate a massive infusion of resources into the ex- 
isting, unreformed public school system, there’s no particular reason to believe 
that the output of schools would improve. (Of course, in these days of budget- 
ary stringency, not many public schools are contemplating a mass infusion of 
resources.)  However, there  are certainly  cases  in particular  school  districts 
where more money was spent in combination  with certain reforms in a way 
that led to improvement in test scores, dropout rates, or other measures of edu- 
cational  achievement. Thus, one might  restate  Hanushek’s  point  to be  that 
money alone won’t  save the schools. But reorganization, perhaps in combina- 
tion with targeted additional money, might offer educational benefits. Even if 
money itself is not what improves the system, perhaps additional money can 
buy a willingness to change that would otherwise be absent. 
Thus, rather than arguing over the level of resources, a useful discussion of 
educational  reform might focus instead on what actual changes should take 
place, either with or without  additional  money. Among the ideas floated  at 
the conference: 
Increase the Quantity of Education. Hanushek points out that, in terms of years 
of  school completed,  America’s level  of  educational  attainment  leveled off 
about two decades ago. One might increase the raw quantity of education either 
by providing greater encouragement for students to proceed with higher educa- 
tion, or increase the quantity of K-12  education with steps like longer school 
days, more homework, or longer school years. Of course, most of these ideas 
cost resources, including the time of teachers, staff, or parents. 
Improve the Quality of Teachers. Everyone remembers the dynamic impact of 
a good teacher,  and  the frustration of  trying to learn with  a poor one. The 
present system tends to reward teachers by  seniority or paper qualifications, 
however, rather  than  by  the job they  do in  the classroom. Many  proposed 
changes for the education  system are best thought of as mechanisms for re- 
warding good teachers. For example, the hope behind a voucher system is that 
students won’t be trapped with worse teachers, and can seek out better ones. 17  Overview 
Other common proposals  are to  allow  teachers  to  start  their  own charter 
schools, to encourage principals or “master teachers” to evaluate teaching di- 
rectly. One powerful way to evaluate any proposal for education is to ask about 
the ways in which it rewards good teachers and penalizes poor ones. 
Focus the Curriculum on Modern Job Skills. One role for education is to create 
a pathway into the workforce. Even without raising test scores, it may be pos- 
sible to teach information and skills that will help students make this transition 
more smoothly. At a simple level, this could mean teaching word-processing 
literacy rather than  typing, and spreadsheet  literacy along with high school 
math. But at a deeper level, it may mean building ties between industry and 
schools-perhaps  through apprenticeships-so  that a high school degree once 
again begins to certify readiness for at least certain jobs, instead of merely 
proving  that  the  student  reached  the  age of  consent  without  acting  badly 
enough to be kicked out. 
Separate the Education and Social Service Budgets. Several discussants noted 
that schools have taken on more and more tasks that are socially important but 
are not basic skills of education: security screening for safe halls and class- 
rooms;  free breakfasts  and  lunches;  driver’s  education;  conflict  resolution; 
counselling; sex and drug information; after-school programs that may be best 
understood as day care for busy parents; and so on. Many of these programs 
are important and productive. As one conference participant said, education 
should be multidimensional, “not just aimed at buying a better car when you’re 
forty.” But there is nonetheless a danger that the tail of extra services, each one 
arguably useful in its own way, could end up wagging the dog of education. To 
clarify the trade-offs, it might be useful to budget separately for certain social 
functions of the schools. At worst, this would provide an additional dimension 
of data for social scientists to exploit; at best, it might lead to a more productive 
public debate over how the resources available to schools should be allocated. 
Remember the Complements to Education.  How children perform  in school 
depends heavily on factors outside the control of the school, like parental time 
and involvement, decent meals, whether the child arrived in kindergarten or 
first grade ready to learn, whether parents are in the labor market, and whether 
the neighborhood is safe. Health care economists accept, almost as common- 
place, the insight that reforming exercise and diet patterns would have a far 
greater impact on American health than any conceivable change in how the 
country finances medical care. Similarly, focusing on these complements  to 
education may provide a greater boost to learning than most changes proposed 
for the educational  system itself.  In  fact, Victor  Fuchs has  entertained  the 
thought experiment that transfemng money out of K-12  education to certain 
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1.3  Health Care Financing 
For supporters of  far-reaching reform of America’s system of health care 
finance, 1993 and 1994 were dispiriting years. It seemed widely agreed that a 
system that gobbles 15% of GDP, while failing to provide health insurance for 
millions of Americans and threatening millions of others with lost coverage, 
should have some room for improvement. But after a year of intense discussion 
following the introduction of President Clinton’s health care plan, nothing hap- 
pened. Not a major reform, not a minor reform, just nothing. In fact, by  the 
time everything was said and left undone, it wasn’t even clear that health care’s 
eighteen months in the public spotlight had enhanced America’s understanding 
of the issues, or laid the framework for a better reform. 
Henry Aaron’s paper can be read as an exploration of why health care reform 
proved such an intractable problem. Politics played a role, of course. But Aaron 
argues that the key problems are central to the nature of the health care industry 
and the inherited patterns of how the United States provides health care. For 
example, new technology is driving up the cost of health care. Because of tax 
breaks  and  limited  information, households  have a distorted perspective  on 
how much health insurance they need. The U.S. “system of health care” is a 
misnomer, Aaron argues, because of the vast number of overlapping policies 
and institutions, public and private, which determine how health care is pro- 
vided. And yet some group has a personal stake in every one of these institu- 
tions, and thus is loath to see it changed. 
Given the  collapse  of  grand  attempts  at health  care reform,  the  present 
agenda seems to involve thinking of smaller reforms that would be useful in 
themselves, and would lead toward an improved system. Aaron’s paper, for ex- 
ample, advocates “the creation of some form of regionally based, politically 
legitimated, administratively capable entity (or entities) [able] to enforce order 
in the financing of health care.” Such entities appeared in many reform propos- 
als, both legislative and academic.  In his comment, Martin Feldstein  raises 
some other possibilities, like changing the tax exclusion for employer-provided 
health insurance,  or medical  savings plans. Other possible  steps to consider 
included guaranteed renewal of  policies, a prohibition against considering pre- 
existing conditions, helping to build capitated health care plans (which operate 
with a preset annual budget), and so on. 
During the discussion at the conference, however, doubts were expressed 
about each of these incremental steps, as well. Even if successful, it’s not clear 
how steps like these would help the working poor who aren’t presently covered 
and would have a hard time paying for insurance. Even if certain of the incre- 
mental reforms would work in a technical sense, it’s not clear they are politi- 
cally acceptable in the present poisoned atmosphere. 
This conference, in October 1994, was not a cheerful time to discuss pros- 
pects for health care reform. But as Aaron points out, the problems that led to 19  Overview 
pressure for reform, like rising costs and fears of losing health insurance cover- 
age, are not going away. In one form or another, the issues will surface again. 
1.4  Long-Term Care 
The post-World  War  I1 baby boom hit the school system in the  1950s and 
1960s, and washed into the labor market in the 1970s and 1980s. Ten or twenty 
years into the twenty-first century, this group will start receiving Social Secu- 
rity. Not too many years after that, they will enter the age bracket that makes 
heavy use of long-term care, a broad category that covers everything from a 
little in-home help with  meals or cleaning to institutional care in a nursing 
home or hospice. 
Alan Garber’s paper lays out the dimensions of this issue: what is actually 
involved in long-term care; what proportion of the population is likely to make 
use of such care; how Medicare and Medicaid presently cover such care; and 
what the options are for providing such care to the baby  boom  generation. 
Garber argues that planning for a future transfer program, from the working- 
age population to the elderly, is not likely  to be economically  or politically 
sustainable. Thus,  the solution must  be to find ways  where the baby  boom 
generation taken as a group saves the money to pay for its future long-term 
care needs. 
Private insurance is one way  in which this sort of saving might occur, but 
neither Garber, nor his discussant, John Shoven, nor the discussion that fol- 
lowed seemed very sanguine about the future of greatly expanding private in- 
surance for long-term care. After all, why purchase insurance for catastrophic 
expenditures on long-term care, since Medicaid pays for such care already after 
an elderly person’s resources are depleted? Why purchase insurance for long- 
term care several decades away, given the possibility that the government will 
create a program to finance such care? Drawing up a contract for long-term 
care that defines what assistance will be provided several decades in the future, 
under what terms, seems extraordinarily difficult. As Shoven documents, ex- 
isting private contracts don’t seem to offer an especially good deal to a forward- 
looking  consumer;  presumably,  myopic  consumers  not  womed about what 
happens a few decades in the future won’t be all that interested in long-term 
care insurance, either. 
Perhaps the most severe problem with depending on people to purchase pri- 
vate insurance far long-term care is that, while  such care may  end up as a 
necessity for many people, it is not a necessity that it is cheerful to contem- 
plate. The whole notion of  needing nursing home care is deeply unattractive. 
To many potential customers, buying insurance for long-term care sounds like 
a way of making sure that when you are old and withered, having difficulties 
dressing or feeding yourself, perhaps incontinent or senile, that you will have 
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participant in the discussion put it, “I’d prefer a vial of sleeping pills and a 
plastic bag.” I find it more pleasant to contemplate the fruits of my life insur- 
ance policy-that  is, in which loved ones have a windfall income after my 
death-than  to contemplate using a long-term care insurance policy. 
But even if private insurance doesn’t provide it, the need for long-term care 
won’t  go away. Without some social intervention, much of the burden seems 
likely to fall on the middle-aged children of the elderly who need care, and 
particularly on the daughters. This could have powerful implications for the 
labor supply of midcareer women. 
The conference  discussion recognized that any serious effort to deal with 
the coming need for long-term care must look at both benefit levels and fi- 
nance. On the benefits side, a program for long-term care needs to recognize 
that  such care forms a spectrum, ranging  from providing  a few meals to a 
person living at home to full and intensive nursing home care. Presumably, one 
wants to build a system where people are encouraged to be as independent as 
possible, to stay in the home and with their natural support system as long as 
possible. This framework argues for not insuring people against the milder or 
shorter forms of home care, like assistance in preparing meals or a one-week 
stay in a nursing home. (If people have insurance for receiving help around the 
house, the size of the program could easily overwhelm public budgets.)  For 
those unlucky enough to have severe and ongoing long-term care needs, how- 
ever, an insurance program may be useful. The challenge on the benefits side 
is to draw the line. 
On the finance side, a program for long-term care needs to recognize that, 
even if  one accepts the need for a system of required  contributions (in the 
belief that private markets aren’t going to meet the need), this system can still 
be structured in many ways. For example, it could be a general tax revenue 
program,  a Social Security extension,  a special  version  of  medical  savings 
plans, or some other method. These different sources of funding can easily 
have very different consequences for whether the program is sustainable in the 
long-term, or whether it has built-in momentum to overexpand, as is discussed 
in the papers by Paul Romer and Robert Frank in this volume. 
1.5  Preferences, Promises, and Entitlement 
Promises don’t have any place in standard models of political behavior, Paul 
Romer points out. In such models, decisions are based on present considera- 
tions, not on words spoken in the past. Romer writes, “Promises, in the lan- 
guage of game theory, are just cheap talk.” But clearly, in the real world, prom- 
ises  create  in  people  a  sense of  entitlement  that  affects  voting  and  the 
formation of policy more broadly. In turn, policy makers know that their prom- 
ises do matter to some extent, and act accordingly. Romer takes on the task of 
explaining why rational people may have preferences that depend on the prom- 
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Romer tackles this question by examining evidence from biology and point- 
ing out that, in many situations, it will be useful for people to have mechanisms 
that help to enforce cooperative behavior. However, calling for retaliation every 
time someone doesn’t cooperate would be an overreaction, potentially leading 
to a cycle of retaliation that destroys the very cooperation one is trying to build. 
Limiting retaliation to situations where a promise has been made can assist in 
building cooperation, while reducing the danger of a cycle of retaliation. 
With this framework, Romer’s paper uses these insights about why promises 
matter to reopen a set of long-standing arguments over why people vote, why 
negative campaigning works, why commitments and promises matter in poli- 
tics, and more. In particular, he uses his argument to explain why the phrasing 
of promises about Social Security has been taken to be so important, both by 
those in favor of expanding the program and by those in favor of reining it 
back. His argument implies that the design of social programs and the promises 
surrounding their passage will influence the life expectancy of such programs, 
and whether they expand or contract with time. 
To  many  economists,  Romer’s use  of  biology  as evidence about rational 
preferences is sure to be controversial. Moreover, the idea of expanded prefer- 
ences always raises  a fear among economists  that we are no longer testing 
hypotheses, but instead are making up ad hoc explanations. Of course, motiva- 
tions derived from biology  need to be treated with care, considered against 
a background  of  other possible motivations, and tested  against a variety  of 
empirical  implications.  But  social  scientists  are  not  so  omniscient  about 
human motivations that they can afford to rule out any evidence that comes to 
hand. 
1.6  Consumption Externalities 
People judge their well-being in relation to those around them. Sometimes 
the effects of such relative valuations may be trivial, like envy that the neigh- 
bor’s house has a nicer view. In other cases, as when one heart is available for 
transplant and three patients are waiting,  the relative values can be life and 
death. In his work over the last few years, Robert Frank has illuminated these 
“consumption externalities”-that  is, how the consumption of one person af- 
fects the utility of others. In this paper, he applies this framework to the design 
of programs for child care, education, health, and long-term care. 
In many of these basic services, Frank argues, it is plausible that consump- 
tion externalities are significant. People want to make sure that their child’s 
education is relatively  good compared to that of other children, and that the 
care they receive in case of illness is as good as what most other people would 
receive. Consider a case where the government provides a basic level service 
to everyone who qualifies, like a K-12  education. What if a family, driven by 
the imperative for its children to be relatively  a bit more educated, wants to 
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can put its children into private schools, but it must then pay for 100%  of their 
education. On the other hand, if the government provided a voucher for the 
value of a basic education, then a family could put its children in alternate, 
pricier schools and only pay the additional amount. 
Frank  argues that  the second alternative is subject  to upward drift in the 
quantity  of  service provided.  People will compete to ensure that their child 
receives  somewhat more education, and political  pressure  will arise for the 
basic amount provided to keep increasing, so that those who can spend extra do 
not gain a relative advantage. Moreover, courts may require a certain amount of 
equality in the provision of basic services like education. In this way, the design 
of a program and the conditions under which people are allowed either to opt 
out or to augment the basic package create powerful incentives for the future 
evolution of that program. 
As was pointed  out in the discussion that followed, Frank’s paper can be 
viewed  as a contribution to a set of questions that come up every time the 
government decides to guarantee that people receive a basic level of a particu- 
lar service. If  the government pays for provision of the service to everyone, 
without  a means test, then the program  looms large in public budgets, and 
imposes a burden  on taxpayers.  When the government  provides  the service 
only to a defined group-say,  those up to a certain income level-then  there 
is a “notch” problem, where a small gain in income means that one is no longer 
eligible for the benefit. As a result, potential  recipients  will try to avoid ex- 
ceeding that level of income. If the government tries to circumvent the notch 
problem by phasing out the program gradually over a range of income levels, 
then  the  phaseout creates incentives  similar to a tax.  For example,  if  the 
amount of public service is reduced by 50 cents every time the recipient earns 
an extra dollar of income, then the recipient only gains 50 cents in income by 
earning a dollar, which is a fairly high marginal tax rate, especially when added 
to the other taxes workers pay. 
Frank’s argument effectively says that, even if a notch problem causes count- 
erproductive incentives, designing a program with a notch may also act as a 
brake on rising public expenditures on certain services. In situations where the 
nation is already  committing a sufficient level of resources-Hanushek  and 
Aaron would argue that education and health care fall into this category-the 
notch may be a useful tool. On the other side, for industries where the resource 
commitment probably needs to increase-Leibowitz  and Garber would argue 
that child care and long-term care fall into this category-then  allowing people 
to augment a basic package may make more sense. 
1.7  Information 
Services are hard to measure. Of course, one can count the amount of time 
a service provider spends on certain tasks, or the amount of money spent on 
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is. Two teachers or doctors may spend exactly the same time with students or 
patients, and yet offer an enormously different quality of service. In principle, 
at least, if information on the quality of service were describable and measur- 
able, then people and suppliers could make more rational choices, and markets 
for services would work much better. Kenneth Arrow’s paper focuses on the 
economics of  information, and reinforces  how  markets will have difficulty 
dealing with  a  valuable,  costly, intangible, nondepletable good  like infor- 
mation. 
On the surface, a call for better information may seem as bland as lukewarm 
milk-toast  made  with  white bread.  But  the  discussion  following the paper 
brought out some interesting distinctions. 
Society may not want to collect some forms of information, or allow that 
information to be used. For example, as it becomes possible to use the emerg- 
ing knowledge of genetic codes to predict the likelihood of certain diseases, 
no one really wants to force those with an unlucky genetic profile to pay more 
for health insurance. Even though women live longer than men, most of  the 
policies that sell long-term care insurance make no distinction in price between 
the sexes. Recently, there has been considerable press coverage of the hypothe- 
sis that racial differences are correlated with measures of intelligence; even if 
this were true (and the case is very far from proven), it is not clear that this 
information assists the functioning of society. In all of these cases, there is a 
conflict between treating people fairly as individuals and information  about 
group tendencies  or differences. In this context, just providing information 
may have results that few would welcome. 
Information about the quality of services can spread in many ways: through 
newspaper and magazine reviews, guidebooks, professional rankings, and so 
on. Businesses may offer recommendations to employees, perhaps about day 
care options. Word of mouth from friends and neighbors can spread quickly. 
In some cases, individuals may be able to gather the information themselves; 
even if I can’t put into precise and quantifiable terms whether I like my child’s 
day care arrangement, I may still be capable of evaluating in ordinal terms 
whether I like it better than the alternatives. Care provided to one’s children 
and to one’s elderly parents are both somewhat visible to the naked eye. On the 
other hand, the quality of education being received in a school is perhaps more 
difficult to judge, at least in a visit of reasonable length. Moreover, it’s harder 
for most people to change their child’s school than it is to change a day care 
center. For most people, it is extremely difficult to judge the quality of medical 
care as it is provided, particularly  the quality  (or necessity) of  costly high- 
tech medicine. 
Although markets for information do not always develop readily, a firm’s 
reputation can be thought of as a way of providing information about the qual- 
ity of service provided. When you go to a McDonald’s, you know with some 
accuracy the quality of the meal you’ll receive. By contrast, a random burger 
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like colleges and universities,  see themselves as competing for students in a 
way that encourages them to develop a reputation. 
An alternative suggestion is that even if a consumer or society can’t judge 
the actual quality of a service as it is provided, we can often measure some 
outcome  of  the service. For example,  we might try to encourage public  or 
private  mechanisms  to reward  surgeons with  the  highest  success rates,  or 
teachers whose students make the greatest gain on standardized tests, even if 
we don’t know exactly how these results were achieved. Of course, rewarding 
workers without understanding how they achieved their results is not fully sat- 
isfactory, either intellectually  or practically. Whenever a particular  metric  is 
used for evaluating services, there is potential for gaming the system. For ex- 
ample, if teachers were rewarded according to student’s test scores, they might 
sacrifice other forms of learning to add expertise on multiple-choice exams, or 
at an extreme, even encourage cheating on the exams. If long-term care provid- 
ers were rewarded, say, according to a survey handed out to patients or rela- 
tives, then they might spend time lobbying patients to give them high marks, 
or “helping” to fill out the surveys, rather than actually providing care. 
These issues are real and difficult. A single accurate measure of the quality 
of service provided  is a will-o’-the-wisp. But even partial, incomplete, occa- 
sionally unreliable information may create incentives for service providers to 
try harder. 
1.8  Organization of Production 
Different institutional forms organize the incentives and flows of informa- 
tion in different ways. Henry Hansmann lays out how the advantages and dis- 
advantages of public, nonprofit, and for-profit institutions determine how they 
are used differently in child care, education, health, and long-term care. He 
finds a strong expansion of for-profit provision and predicts that, just as a wave 
of  for-profit  providers  has revolutionized  health care in the last twenty-five 
years, for-profits may dramatically alter education in the next twenty-five. 
The discussion that followed, led by Joseph Grundfest’s comments, focused 
heavily on the fluidity of these organizational forms. Public organizations may 
function rather differently at the local, state, and federal levels. Nonprofits may 
either live on donations or by  selling a good or service. For-profit institutions 
may either compete against other firms for sales to the private sector, or bid for 
the right to run public services like garbage collection. Of course, public-sector 
or nonprofit providers behave differently in the presence of competition, and 
differently depending on whether that competition comes from their own kind 
or from for-profit institutions. Moreover, as Grundfest’s comment explores in 
detail, organizational forms can shift. Public providers can be privatized, non- 
profits can take on for-profit status, or the public sector can decide to subsidize 
or provide directly in competition with other providers. 
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spreading. While economists are rarely surprised by the success of the profit 
motive, there is reason for mild surprise in the case of the four service indus- 
tries on which this volume focuses. After all, when one is searching for, say, 
health  care, a cost-cutting for-profit institution  may  seem more threatening 
than attractive. Some would argue that making a profit from providing services 
like health care, education, or care for the elderly will necessarily force provid- 
ers to skimp on the quality of service in the name of making a buck. 
Of course, this criticism of  the for-profit organizational form is not obvi- 
ously true. A forward-looking for-profit firm may recognize that a reputation 
for skimping on services will reduce profits in the long run, and put it out of 
business, so it will try to build a reputation for high-quality service and innova- 
tion. By contrast, a government agency may feel that, without competition, 
there is little need to provide the most cost-effective and high-quality service. 
Apparently, at least for the present and for the sectors on which this volume 
focuses, the advantages of the for-profit organizational form in promoting ef- 
ficiency and holding down costs are overbalancing the potential disadvantage 
of cut-rate service. 
Even when service providers are not officially for-profit, more of them seem 
to be taking on a mentality of providing value for money. Even among non- 
profits  and public-sector  providers,  many discussants at the conference re- 
ported hearing talk of  reinventing government, customer focus, and treating 
separable parts of an institution (like a university’s law school) as separate cost 
centers. All of these are very much the sort of thinking that suffuses the for- 
profit sector. 
1.9  Government in Health and Education 
Economists have a neat scheme for figuring out when the government should 
intervene  in markets.  They  have developed a list of  market failures:  cases 
where because of externalities, public goods, distributional concerns, informa- 
tion problems, or other reasons, markets either won’t exist, or won’t clear, or 
won’t set prices that accurately balance social costs and benefits. This frame- 
work has proven extraordinarily useful for making judgments about the costs 
and benefits of policies. In his paper, James Poterba tackles the difficult ques- 
tion of whether market failures can also provide a framework for discussing 
how policies are actually chosen and implemented. 
His results are frustrating, but perhaps not surprising. Principles of  public 
finance (like taxing to offset externalities) and redistribution  do not seem to 
be driving what services are actually provided in the areas of health care and 
education. Jurisdictions that appear similar have followed very different paths 
in providing such services, depending on what seem nothing more than quirks 
of history, or the interests of groups that deliver the services. 
These findings are troubling to economists on several levels. If market forces 
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or their mix has any particular support from economic logic. It implies that 
when economists talk, no one is particularly listening. It implies that economic 
principles are largely unconnected to what has actually happened. 
The conference discussion that followed raised two fronts on which these 
grim conclusions  might be addressed.  On one side, it might be possible  to 
discover what sorts of ideas and appeals do carry weight in the public debate, 
and then to find ways of linking them to economic insights. Economics is a 
powerful tool for pointing out costs, benefits, and trade-offs; it would be sur- 
prising if this information could not be marshalled to better effect. In addition, 
economists should remember that market failure is not the only justification for 
government programs, and moderate their rhetoric accordingly. For example, 
market failures and measurable externalities may well be involved in policies 
that affect public values like patriotism, thrift, working hard, and honesty. But 
if economists would recognize that these values also have an independent im- 
portance of their own, they might end up doing a better job of explaining the 
world around them. 
Either way, building a closer connection from the arguments of economists 
to the policies that are enacted seems a worthy goal. 
1.10  The Politics of Social Policy 
Most of the contributors to this volume are economists. Theda Skocpol is a 
sociologist. As she explained at the conference one evening after dinner, this 
doesn’t mean that she thinks economists are powerless. Instead, she believes 
they have great power-just  not in the directions that they think. 
Her analysis in this paper focuses on four great waves of social reform: one 
involving  Civil War  veterans  in  the  late  nineteenth  century;  one involving 
mothers and children in the 1910s and 1920s; the New Deal of the 1930s; and 
the Great Society changes of the  1960s. She argues that a full understanding 
of these changes involves understanding how a nation comes to feel a particular 
sense of  obligation to different groups at different times,  and how  existing 
programs grow and evolve in response to what society finds to be the especially 
salient arguments. 
These arguments don’t come in neat bunches. For example, some programs 
succeeded by providing a feeling that any government benefits were somehow 
earned by the recipients, as in veterans’ benefits or Social Security. Local con- 
trol  of institutions,  like  schools and hospitals, has often  helped  foster their 
spread. The conference discussion that followed focused on a variety of public 
appeals  that  have  been  either  successful  in  promoting  programs-or  in 
blocking them. For example, it is often powerful in the U.S. political  system 
to appeal to the need for a unified society; to ask for tolerance of diversity; to 
rage against big bureaucracy; to draw analogies to programs that are perceived 
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in recent environmentalist and anticrime movements); and to appeal to “don’t 
tread on me” individualism. As one participant noted at the conference, with 
only a little defensiveness, being hostile to economists, cost effectiveness, and 
efficiency concerns is usually a powerful way of appealing to the broad Ameri- 
can public, too. 
Skocpol’s paper illuminates certain themes raised by earlier papers in the 
volume. For example,  Romer discusses why  promises might  be  important, 
while Skocpol discusses which sorts of  arguments have been especially power- 
ful in national discourse. Poterba points out that the common market failure 
language of economists doesn’t seem descriptive of what is actually happening. 
Skocpol focuses on what has actually happened, and what elements of social 
programs appealed to the public in ways that affected the evolution of the pro- 
gram. What remains to be done is to discover or create links between the struc- 
tured terms of  art for economics and the broader terms of persuasive public 
discourse. 
1.11  Thinking about Service Industries 
The four industries discussed in this volume-child  care, education, health 
care, and long-term care-are  all service industries. When economists discuss 
such service industries, I believe that they often run into problems by focusing 
almost immediately on the “industry” aspects, rather than the idea of “service.” 
Economists talk about the growth of service industries in terms of sales and 
employees; whether service industry jobs will all be low-paid hamburger flip- 
pers or high-paid investment bankers; how to measure productivity growth in 
service industries; or how the output of services affects the balance of trade 
and national competitiveness. 
These subjects deserve considerable attention. But as economists hasten to 
plant their feet firmly on the hard analysis of  service industries, their discus- 
sions usually overlook the softer, more humanistic idea of service. This is sur- 
prising in a way, because the ideal of  service comes up often enough in aca- 
demic  life.  Decisions  about  tenure  for  professors  usually  have  a  service 
component. Some colleges and universities have a service requirement for stu- 
dents. Every now and again, the adults in Congress propose a national service 
requirement for teenagers. More generally, the notion of service to others ex- 
erts a strong ethical and moral attraction  in every great world religion and 
culture. 
Of course, the tug of that moral feeling varies considerably across service 
industries: the ethical issues involved in giving someone a good manicure are 
not comparable to those of educating a child or looking after a dying cancer 
patient. But when the full-fledged ideal of service mixes with a capitalist econ- 
omy and a democratic policy, passions are often ignited. Bloodless terms like 
“demand” and “supply” seem somehow too meek to convey the arguments. 28  Timothy Taylor 
Instead, the discussion begins to talk about “basic human  needs” for health 
care or long-term care of the elderly. Providers of services like education or 
child care are somehow expected to do their jobs in some part because of a love 
for children, not in the assembly-line  spirit presumed  to exist in nonservice 
industries. Indeed, as one conference  participant put it, one challenge of  fi- 
nancing child care is to make it possible for those who really would be wonder- 
ful at looking after children to be able to make a good living doing so. The 
same might be said of education, or long-term care for the elderly. 
The service industries on which this volume focuses touch on looking after 
children, and helping  the sick and elderly. In all of these cases, the idea of 
service touches a moral chord, and leaves a resonance behind. In such a setting, 
where terms like “need,” “love,” “duty,” and “justice”  are hurled about, the 
allocation of scarce resources becomes especially contentious. Government in- 
evitably becomes involved. But while government has considerable power to 
redistribute resources and to set the ground rules that organize markets, it has 
no magic wand to make scarcity disappear, or to make love and caring appear. 
Instead, it must struggle to perceive how such services are provided outside 
the government sector, by a combination of family, voluntary associations, and 
the market, and then decide upon the role that government should play. That 
role can range from laissez-faire, to mandating characteristics of the service 
without government finance, to offering government money along with man- 
dates about service characteristics, all the way to direct government provision 
of certain services. 
Economics often has the useful effect of  taking some of the steam out of 
public  policy  debates. Arguments  about environmental  destruction,  for ex- 
ample, may start out as the earth despoilers versus the tree huggers, but in the 
hands of economists, the argument focuses on what price accurately captures 
the  negative  externalities  of  certain  activities.  By  focusing  on the  margin, 
rather than on the absolutes of unquantifiable moral judgments, economists 
have often been able to suggest technocratic middle-of-the-road solutions. 
But for the service industries discussed in this volume, my suspicion is that 
economists have been too technocratic, too eager to fit the public disputes into 
their preset mental categories of market failure and redistribution. With service 
industries that touch our common humanity as closely as care for young chil- 
dren, teaching and education, looking after the sick and injured, and care for 
the elderly, this level of detachment is only a useful starting point. In the end, 
it will not suffice. If economists want to be relevant to the broader social debate 
on the evolution of these service industries, they will have to venture out on 
some creakier limbs. They will have to leaven their professional concern about 
efficiency with judgments about the justice of entitlements, the fairness of con- 
sumption externalities and who should pay, and insights about long-term politi- 
cal dynamics. 
Of  course,  there  is always concern  that  a few steps  down such  slippery 
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demonstrate that such thinking can proceed with academic precision and un- 
derstatement, while still capturing many of the undertones of what is touching 
and personal in these service industries. Moreover, an unwillingness to enter 
this arena will leave economists as perpetual outsiders, carping about how the 
world does not fit their models. In this case, the danger is that economics could 
lose the fundamentally social nature of its science. This Page Intentionally Left Blank